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Cover Page Footnote
With love to my family for their support and edits.

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‘A Tryst with Animosity’: The Souring of Indo-American Relations from 1947-1971

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Abstract

This paper explores multi-decade tensions in Indo-American relations, emphasizing the formative nature of the colonial legacy on India’s foreign policy and resulting conflict with the Truman Doctrine. By examining the popular perception of foreign policy through political leaders, newspapers, ideological conflicts and State Department records, I illustrate how each nation’s sovereign agenda colored their reception of the other’s global initiatives. The year 1947 marked a point of departure in American foreign policy in two respects; a renewed commitment to economic and military engagement with global affairs under the presidency of Harry Truman, and an expanded interest in diplomacy with developing nations, such as the Republic of India. Contrary to expectations, the promising beginnings of 1947 found no realization amid accelerating hostilities, ultimately leading to the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971. This paper analyzes this understudied period in Indo-American relations – probing the underlying causes behind the devolution of relations from 1947-1971. Existing scholarly reflection on this topic has focused on the formative years of the 1950s or the immediate aftermath of 1971. This overlooks key conflicts and geopolitical events such as the annexation of Goa that further disparaged hopes for alliance in the late 50’s and 60’s. I conclude that the gap in Indo-American relations developed from both ideological and diplomatic misgivings as well as shifts in relations for both powers with China and Pakistan. Finally, I discuss the repercussions of intransigence in
US Cold War grand strategy through the Indian example, in an era where such policy is resurgent.

**Keywords:** British India, Indian Independence, Truman Doctrine, Indo-American Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru, colonialism, socialism, Soviet Union, Friendship Treaty, International Relations, History, Asiatic Foreign Policy

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**Introduction**

Indo-American relations reached a nadir in 1971. With the signing of a friendship treaty with the USSR, India broke with its nonaligned traditions, becoming a Soviet victory in the conflict for the “hearts and minds” of the Third World. This conclusion was by no means historically preordained. To the contrary, India and the United States had much to align them at the closure of 1947. They possessed popular leaders with nominally aligned internationalist visions. Nehru’s ‘Tryst with Destiny’ speech proclaimed India’s commitment to “fight [to] end poverty and ignorance and disease”, recognizing a world where disaster “can no longer be split into isolated fragments” (Nehru 1947). This vision finds resonance in Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ and Harry Truman’s belief in a responsibility for the ‘welfare of the world’.

Furthermore, both nations had arisen victorious from periods of intense turmoil – the United States from its involvement in World War II, and India in its independence struggle with the United Kingdom. This is to speak nothing of the natural fellowship and camaraderie expected between the world’s most populous and the world’s most powerful democracies. Some scholars conjectured even that ‘like a marriage made in heaven, India and America would live happily ever after” (Sinha 2010). As such, the devolution of the Indo-American relationship poses a
question of deep historical interest. Several factors fermented these promising beginnings after
1947 – the inherent incompatibility between American foreign policy in the 1950s and Indian
sovereign initiatives, the commanding influence of postcolonial ideology on Indian foreign
policy, and evolutions for both powers in their relations to China and Pakistan in the 1960’s.

Prefacing Indo-American Relations prior to 1947; 1783-1890

“...and the rocket’s red glare, / the bombs bursting in air, / gave truth to that night, / that
our flag was still there”.

Francis Scott Key’s well-known words form an elegant microcosm of the pre-
Independence history of India and the United States. Unbeknownst to Key, the Congreve rockets
used by the British in the Battle of Baltimore were inspired by and used alongside the Indian
Mysorean rockets popularized by Tipu Sultan (Sickle 2012). This intertwined yet distant
connection characterizes much of Indo-American pre-1947 relations – perennially peripheral. In
the late 1700s and early 1800s, American states were concerned with the inner country’s Native
American populations, westward expansion, and foreign policies focused on a “perplexed and
critical posture” towards European interstate belligerence (Washington 1796). Largely the
Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe administrations through to that of Herbert
Hoover did not include Indian affairs within a larger American policy framework. Adams’s
speech on the 1821 anniversary of American Independence, arguably the first major public
reflection on the future of American policy, professed an affixation with “[seeking] refuge from
its [Europe’s] fury, in the wilderness of this Western World” (Adams 1821). American
ideological and political orientations were distinctly inward looking.

What contact remained between India and the United States from American
independence in 1783 unto the Gilded Age was economic in nature. Key’s poem yields a second
insight of the “red glare” – the latent trade connections fostered from the British Empire. As Rajiv Gandhi would humorously quip several hundred years later afront the United States Congress, “Indian tea stimulated your independence movement” (Sharma 2016). Great Britain exercised economic preeminence through its navies and Asiatic trade networks, evidenced amply by American revolutionaries’ strategic choice to seek French alliance for fear of complete British naval dominance during the American revolution. This degree of naval integration facilitated later economic activity. American merchants held some interest in Indian trade, particularly with Tipu Sultan and the western Marathas, and had some exposure due to the East India Company’s favored status ranking of India throughout the 18th century (Misra 1965). War in 1812 complicated the East India Company’s allowance of such trade, as did increased tariffs. Naturally economic interaction begets the formation of more formal political connections. Nonetheless the American consulate in India was perfunctory; pitiful salaries and a lack of agency kept the post ill staffed and ineffective (Misra 1965).

This economic connection strengthened in the 1880s as the United States recovered from the Civil War. By 1881 the United States was importing $18,012,000 (1881 amount) worth of imports from British India, albeit three-fourths of it was carried by foreign vessels or British ships (Misra 1965). Although Britain remained the instrumental connection between India and the United States, it was equally the impediment towards full-spectrum diplomatic relations. The British Crown took direct rulership of India following the 1857 mutiny with intent to reimagine the colonial relationship. It is fair conjecture to consider that the earlier British failure to combat American insurgence informed the Crown’s reformist policies; a contemporary saying reflected that “without India, Great Britain would subside into a third-rate state…” (Belmekki 2008). The British Crown backed military reforms, alongside integrating Indians into the Indian Civil
Service and the less substantive admittance to the advisory council of the Governor-General (Belmekki 2008). Simultaneously, the Crown held tighter to its near monopoly on trade with India; nearly two-thirds of foreign Asiatic trade was in British hands by 1881, and some $507,437,000 of goods were exchanged between the two (United States Dept. of State 1856). This mercantilist economic policy impeded the development of Indo-American trade into a more significant commercial relationship.

Yet there was little perception in the American mind of India, and such sparse knowledge held likewise. Whatever formative image existed was coloured in towards the later years of the 1890s. A prominent example is the travels and lectures of Swami Vivekananda to California, which may have influenced the characteristic counterculture of the San Francisco Bay areas.

From the American side, Mark Twain made a venture to India, and left much enamored with “that one land all men desire to see, and having seen once, by even a glimpse, would not give that glimpse for the shows of all the rest of the world...” (Eutsey 2017). Scarce interaction laid outside the occasional travels of philosophical and literary figures.

From the fascination of the American ethos with westward expansion and perilous dealings with European relations, to India’s brewing grievances against distant monarchy, the pre-Indian independence picture of Indo-American relations is one of largely independent development. British India and the United States were not in complete isolation and possessed a degree of economic relations. Yet neither featured the other in their policy worldview – India at the vicarious behest of London’s affairs and worldview, and the United States continentally and conceptually detached from the Old World. As the United States was gaining independence, British India was steadily losing the same; as the United States rose to play a pre-eminent role in international affairs, British India followed the foreign policy of the Crown (Sharma 2016). This
The divergence of experience would greatly inform each nation’s personal and external initiatives as
the year 1947 unfolded.

1947 – 1953: The Truman Doctrine and Nehruvian Neutrality Clash

The year 1947 marked a critical juncture in the history of relations between India and the
United States. It harkened an independent Indian state, now able to control and engage with a
sovereign foreign relations machinery. The Indian Independence Movement forged a generation
of political leaders in India, foremost in prominence being Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In the
United States, 1947 marked President Harry Truman’s ascendance into a political figure of his
own right, away from the exigencies concerning a wartime leader. The origins and circumstances
of both leaders affected their foreign policies, with dramatic implications for Indo-American
relations.

Truman arose to the Presidency in unusual fashion. He moved up through Democratic
politics by virtue of the Thomas Pendergast political machine. Having forged a contrasting
reputation for his honesty and civil service, and later for his work in an eponymous Senate
Committee, Truman found himself the Democratic Party’s vice-presidential pick over populist,
left-wing Henry Wallace ("The Truman Committee", 2019). Truman then acceded to the
presidency following Franklin Roosevelt’s demise in 1944.

Truman was sympathetic to Roosevelt and Wilson’s internationalism. More than any
other, he consolidated US global involvement at a time when internationalism was facing
question. After World War II, the United States’ citizenry could have retrenched and focused on
domestic economic prosperity, mirroring their reaction to the horrors of World War I. Such
noninterventionism and/or isolationism was exemplified in the Congress’s express rejection of
Involvement in WW2 itself had not been popular, with Franklin Roosevelt openly engaging only after the events of Pearl Harbor, against domestic opposition headed by Charles Lindbergh. Thus, maintaining interventionist ideals was not a given, nor a necessarily popular stance after WW2. Truman adopted some of the benevolent rhetoric of his predecessors in “believing [the US] must assist free peoples” (Truman 1947) but was pressured by partisan opposition and a second Red Scare to ensure that the US would remain domineering on the international advances of the Soviet Union. Whether these circumstances robbed Truman’s internationalism from Franklin Roosevelt’s concern for colonial liberation at the Yalta Conference is a separate question. That Truman would re-engage with global affairs in emphatic fashion placed Southern Asia within the US policy purview, and India with it.

India, too, received a leader with a mind to engage with the world at large. Nehru was regarded as something of a political celebrity following Indian independence and seen as a pivotal leader in South Asian affairs (Nehru 1940; Gould 1988; Merrill 1987). Educated at Cambridge, Nehru professed a Western tilt - “I looked upon the world from an Englishman’s standpoint” – which provided encouragement to American policymakers seeking sympathetic – if not acquiescent – leadership in the Asiatic region (Merrill 1987). Whilst jailed for his activism, Nehru read voraciously what material of world affairs was available. He was enthusiastic that India would play a pivotal role in the Second World War – that notwithstanding, that India would become an international player aligned with a moral governance that Europe and America, in his view, often came short of (Merrill 1987). Nehru applauded Soviet industry, was sympathetic to their strains of socialism, and their upliftment from penury, but also admired American democracy and innovation. His writings in 1947 bespeak his determination that India
should chart a third path, fiercely independent, that would merge the accomplishments of each
system (Nehru 1946).

For Nehru, foreign policy focused on upholding national sovereignty, supporting other
postcolonial Asian nations in achieving such, and remaining nonaligned to US or Soviet
interests. Nehru was committed that India should not allow external pressures to influence Indian
foreign policy; as he remarked in Calcutta, India was not “to be a suppliant country” and would
welcome no “patronage or imposition” on behalf of other powers (Clymer 1990). Herein lay the
incompatibility of the two policy philosophies. Indian sovereign actions would be taken,
appearing to be detrimental to United States global initiatives; and in the opposite, American
actions taken within the global sphere would seem acutely anti-India.

The conflict between Nehru’s neutral idealism and Truman’s international ardency
manifested quickly. American foreign policy centered on a vision of closely strategic, if
monolithic, power-blocs. The ‘Truman Doctrine’, established before a joint session of Congress
in 1947, consolidated American support unconditionally for anti-Communist movements
worldwide. This policy’s underlying, material consequence was that the US would operate with a
clear, proactive delineation between pro- and anti-American factions. Substantiation of this point
is readily provided by the Truman administration’s Marshall Plan, refusal to recognize
Communist China, and military assistance to anti-communist forces in the Philippines,
Indonesia, and French Indochina (Merrill 1987). This framework was inherently inflexible,
viewing nations as either integral cogs to American security or Soviet sympathizers, not crediting
sovereign national actions as based on external considerations rather than from an intent of
friendship or malice to the US.
When the question of Kashmir was brought to the UN, the United States lent towards the Pakistani perspective, having realized the strategic role that the Northern Pakistani Border would lend to Soviet containment; a clear example of the Truman Doctrine’s methodical application. These stances were much to the chagrin of Indian policymakers who saw the integrity of Kashmiri territory as a proxy of India’s international influence and standing. India’s formal complaint to the United Nations in 1948 declared that “responsibility for [Kashmir’s defense] should be taken over by a government capable of discharging it… [India] could not allow a neighboring and friendly state to be compelled by force” (“India Security Council” 1948). India continued to vote against measures that the United States was for and was on several occasions the beneficiary of Soviet vetoes. Disagreement abounded on the colonial front – the United States backed its NATO allies, whereas India took issue with events such as Dutch aggression against the Indonesian Republican Army (Merrill 1987). India assembled several postcolonial and Asian nations to New Delhi in 1949 to condemn the Dutch for their actions, and to the alarm of American policymakers, minced no terms in finding western nations culpable in the propagation of colonial interests (“Conference on Indonesia” 1949).

The actions of the Dutch serve as a case study for Nehruvian-Truman ideological conflict. The vehemence of India’s anticolonial sentiment, a corollary of the vested interests the postcolonial nations shared in ensuring their mutual sovereignty went respected, was received as inimical and perhaps even Communist by the Truman administration (Merrill 1987). Considering that the composition of anti-colonial revolutionaries in Indonesia and throughout Asia had a markedly Marxist tilt, these fears were not completely misplaced. Yet, in placing India as a supporter and possible perpetrator of the Soviet cause because of incidental opposition to a United States ally both created antipathy and prevented a more nuanced understanding. On the
Indian side, conflating the United States’ collective security doctrine with colonial intent, considering the role Franklin Roosevelt had played in confronting the United Kingdom on their colonial ventures (Roosevelt 1941), proved similarly reductionist.

This unease was propounded by the politics of aid. While the Truman administration most famously provided military and economic assistance, food aid was also used as a means to procure alliance and attenuate communist influence. Truman stated this clearly when he referred to US preference “in giving preference to the liberated peoples and those who fought among us…” (“Conference on Indonesia 1949). This caused consternation in India, as it seemed that Truman had little recollection of the millions of Indian soldiers who had fought in the War and in the conflict before it (Sinha 2010). Furthermore, such aid contradicted directly the pride of India’s leadership and Nehru’s certainty that India should not seem to be at the mercy of Western powers. The balance of perception proved difficult between satisfying domestic need and projecting self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, a string of poor harvests necessitated outreach. In this effort, India attempted on numerous occasions to obtain American food aid prior to 1947, which it never gained in sufficient measure due to American concerns of overextended foreign responsibilities, alongside distrust of Nehruvian neutrality. The United States focused on “extract[ing] political and economic concessions” and in doing so deeply harmed their image in India as a potential ally and the moral superior to the Soviet Union, with whom Nehru announced in 1946 India would pursue closer relations (Sinha 2010). Thus, did the Truman Doctrine’s fixation with supplying aid to bolster Indian loyalty, which was ironically achievable with offers of unconditional aid, drove India further away. Nehruvian pride made the acceptance of agenda-tainted assistance anathema, even at the cost of ameliorating the country’s significant hunger.
Meetings with American officials, and Nehru’s official state visit to the United States in 1949, did little to soothe these growing divides. If anything, they became a confirmation of what American policymakers had already suggested was a relational incompatibility. Although several American officials, including Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Henry Grady, had expressed concern, popular perception of Nehru also came to be questioned in the United States. That Nehru would orate about Western imperialism as an equivalent ill to Soviet Communism confounded many; as *Time* magazine stated, was America not “the first great power in its right mind that had ever kept a promise to free a colony?” (Sinha 2010). Yet there was an air of undeniable optimism surrounding Nehru’s state visit – the New York Times remarked that Nehru’s arrival portended “an East-West meeting under nearly flawless circumstances,” further harkening to the legacy and spirit of Franklin Roosevelt in an eager assessment of India’s potential as a partner (Waggoner 1949). Unfortunately, nothing was accomplished during Nehru’s interactions with State Department officials and Truman himself. In a comical series of exchanges, Nehru pridefully neglected to mention the material plights of India; Acheson proclaimed support for French intervention in Vietnam; Nehru spoke positively of Chinese agrarianism (Acheson 1949). The contrast of Indian and American motivations – and each other’s confusion towards one another - was captured in a single conversation.

NSC 48 would later reflect the failure of the meeting to solve the intellectual and framework challenges posed by Nehru and Truman’s conflicting approaches. NSC 48 did not distinguish the nationalism of postcolonial Asian nations – which was incidentally socialist in character – from the authoritarian communism of the Soviet Union. As for India, NSC 48 characterized the solidarity of the New Delhi Conference nations as “a third force”, which would
“[make it] unwise to regard…more particularly India … against the extension of Communist control in Asia” (“NSC 48 Full Text” 1949).

From Tension to Distaste – Goa, Dadra, Nagar Haveli

America’s low tolerance for ambivalence from regional partners – especially those who were the beneficiary of American aid – and India’s stubborn protection of its sovereignty and political independence had become clear by the closure of 1950. Geopolitical conflicts between India and other world players during the Kashmir crisis of 1947 had plunged Nehru and his cabinet into the forefront of United Nations attention and familiarized them with its composition and culture. It seemed inevitable that another crisis would arise to inevitably strain already irate diplomatic relations.

The event came in the form of the American response to India’s annexation of Goa, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli from Portugal from 1954-55 and in 1961. Portugal remained the last European power to hold territory in India post-1947, with several coastal exclaves. Nehru had attempted on numerous occasions to peacefully transfer control, but Portugal was unenthusiastic about Indian attempts to diplomatically resolve the territories. As Nehruvian rhetoric grew in intensity and with irritancy against colonial continuation, Portugal became equally fearful of Indian retaliation. Public opinion had already turned against Portugal, whose troops had killed some 20 to 30 unarmed Indian activists attempting to enter Goa (Rosenthal 1955). Tensions between the two boiled over as Portugal preemptively attacked the Indian passenger ship Sabarmati for fear of a secret military landing (Couto 2006). To the surprise of the international community, the Indian government opted for military action to annex the territories.

In response, the United States condemned Indian interference, viewing the actions as unprompted aggression on a fellow NATO member. This response strategically failed to be
prescient about the winding arcs of decolonization and of surging nationalism among newly independent nations. Portuguese territories symbolized a legacy of Eurocentric dominance rather than any pertinent strategic value to the Indian government, which already possessed thousands of miles of coastal access. By siding with Portugal due to their NATO relationship, the United States placed itself even further against popular currents of global anticolonial sentiment. In comparison, the USSR took the opportunity to align itself with Asian nationalism. Leonid Brezhnev addressed criticism of India as hypocritical coming from those who “are accustomed to strangling peoples striving for independence,” preceding the USSR vetoing a Security Council resolution on Goa (Sharma 1999).

US failure to place Indian actions in context, addressing the issue simplistically as a threat to a NATO ally and by extension collective security via the Truman Doctrine, demonstrates how American global strategy failed to adapt to situations that were not necessarily significant to a larger US-Soviet conflict. This inflexibility continued to manifest in frustration towards Indian neutrality. American diplomats began to see ambivalence as worrisome indecision. US State Department records show Ambassador Henry Grady’s comments to Nehru, detailing that India must not “straddle... [and] should get on the democratic side immediately” (McMahon 2013).

Nehru could ill oblige Grady’s request. His policy drew from domestic circumstances rather than Cold War partiality. The act to swiftly capture former Portuguese territories, engaging no external stakeholders, drew from an acute wariness of entanglement in the conflicts of foreign powers as colored by colonial India’s experience of the World Wars. Additionally, as historian Norman D. Palmer notes, the commanding strength of the Indian opposition party, sympathetic to the USSR, constrained how close to the West Nehru could be perceived while
retaining popularity (Palmer 1954). The Indian case exemplifies how independent nation-states oriented their policies around historical contingencies and domestic considerations in the late 40’s and throughout the 50’s, illustrating how the American intellectual framework of global conflict misaligned with the complex considerations of national leaders. The American response to India’s invasion – as the West saw it – or liberation, as the East saw it – laid low the potential for amiable foreign relations.

Towards the 1960s – Analyzing Indian Anticolonialism

As discussed in prior, American insensitivity to India’s strong anticolonial sentiments further deteriorated relations from 1947 to 1959. Yet, early ideological mistrust had permeated the Indo-American relationship, due to an Indian “fixation on anticolonialism” (Gould 1988). The irony of the Allied war effort, proclaiming democracy and freedom as objectives, yet composed largely of colonial powers, was not lost upon India. A minor sect of the British-Indian Army under Subhas Chandra Bose was so vehemently anticolonial that it allied with the Axis. Furthermore, America’s alignment with European powers after WWII directly influenced Nehru’s trust in American values; as he details in his book The Discovery of India, he saw Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ as rhetoric without action, as “rich England, and richer America paid little heed to the hunger of the body that was killing millions [in Bengal] ...” (Nehru 1946). With this context of diminished faith in US intentions, India’s apparently contradictory faith in the UN and opposition to the Security Council’s 1952 Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir is explainable, appearing as a forced resolution of the conflict by Western powers without considering Indian sovereignty.

On this point, the Soviet Union seized the open opportunity. By allying with colonial powers, the United States allowed the Soviet Union to argue that colonialism was but a kind of
capitalism (an argument drawn from V.I Lenin’s *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*) and therefore, that siding with the US was a re-affirmation of colonialism. Soviet propaganda of the era marketed this point relentlessly. Reading ‘Colonialism Is Doomed!’, and depicting a variety of ethnic groups, the left cartoon (Figure 1) makes a Marxist appeal to international worker’s solidarity against a common struggle, thus casting the Soviet Union as an ideological and substantive friend of the post-colonial world. The right cartoon (Figure 2) critiques the Truman Doctrine’s commitment to countering “attempted subjugation” of peoples by depicting American commitments to peace as underlined by US military-industrial interests. The appeal was both rhetorically and ideologically sound. The nations responsible for colonialism, and those involved deeply in the First and Second World Wars, were largely capitalist and market oriented. As post-colonial thinkers began envisioning their nations, there became a curiosity towards socialism, and indeed Soviet Communism, in light of the substantial industrialization that had occurred in once poor and derelict Russia. Postcolonial nations such as India found themselves in a similarly deprived state at that moment, and simultaneously presented with a potential model by which to relieve such penury.

*Figure 1*

*Figure 2*
This appearance of neocolonial interests coloring American policy had also affected the perception of conditional American aid, which was famously countered in 1952 by unconditional offers of grain from the Soviet Union and China. Conditional aid had furthered suspicions that the West sought to keep India in socioeconomic debt bondage in order to control its foreign policy and thereby restore something of the mercantilism of the British Empire. Another dent in relations came from Indian opposition to American war efforts in Korea and Vietnam. This shocked Americans; a New York Times issue lambasted Indian opposition when American capital was being used “to help Asia preserve her independence and raise her standard of living” (Sharma 1956). However, the underlying rationale drew again from ardent anti-imperialism, as India had never suffered injustice from communism but had from colonialism, and therefore the threat of re-emerging Western influence was much more real than the threat of North Korean and Vietnamese victory. This signifies the extent to which the recent past influenced Indian policy, whereas considerations of the future commanded American concerns. This divergence of visions, and American misunderstanding of Indian anti-colonialism were a compelling underlying factor behind the failures of 1947-1959.

1960-1971—End of Nehruvian Era; A Survey of China and Pakistan

From 1960 to 1971, the evolving relationship of both powers to China and Pakistan further harmed diplomatic relations. Until 1962, India considered itself a regional ally of China, having signed the Panchsheel principles confirming mutual non-aggression. Nehru had constantly emphasized the role that China would play in crafting a rising Asian alliance and had been among China’s strongest allies in advocating for its government’s formal recognition by Western nations. India had established diplomatic and communicative channels early, alongside a group from both governments committed to representing Indo-Chinese friendship and good
will. The slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers) also became popularized in this era, emblematic of the close ties the nations shared (Radchenko 2014). In contrast, the United States took a wary, hostile stance to Mao’s China in the 60’s, conscious of Chinese aid to North Vietnam and Truman’s precedent of support for the Kuomintang. India had formally recognized the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China, whereas the US recognized Taiwan and opposed any entry of the People’s Republic of China into the UN (Palmer 1954). Documents such as NSC 48 had also acknowledged that China was a preeminent danger in the Asian continent and would exert considerable pressure on surrounding nations to succumb to Communist influence. The closeness of these relations was another point of contention, leading to the recommendation that India would be an insufficient counterweight in anti-communist efforts.

Post 1962, serious transitions in Indian and American attitudes to China occurred - in opposite directions. Indo-Chinese territorial conflicts burgeoned, particularly over areas that were formerly defended by the British Empire. To the great alarm of Nehru and the Indian people, China opted for a full-force military operation of nearly 80,000 soldiers to claim these territories. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 shattered Indian trust in the Chinese state, improving Sino-Pakistan relations and prompting Indian militarization. It was also a pivotal moment for Nehru, who, having led India during the independence struggle and ever since, had finally fallen from public grace. Indian political maverick V.K. Menon would lose his post as Defense minister, and Nehru himself would pass away not too long afterwards (“Krishna Menon Resigns” 1962).

Leadership change in both countries – Richard Nixon in the US, Indira Gandhi in India – led to US efforts to ally with China to break the Sino-Soviet bloc, aware of how Gandhi’s pro-
Soviet convictions would change the power balance in Asia. In Pakistan, Ayub Khan’s administration in the 60’s marked a warming of the US-Pakistan relationship. With US influence, Pakistan’s relatively market-oriented policies resulted in 9.38% GDP growth in 1964 (Aziz 2009), in contrast to India’s Soviet-inspired Five-Year Plans.

Nixon’s presidency improved US-Pakistan relations; before the 1971 war, Nixon almost doubled aid to Pakistan (“Aid to Pakistan” 2013). Comparatively, Indo-Pakistan relations nosedived, with war in both 1965 and 1971 despite reconciliatory arrangements such as the Tashkent and Shimla Accords. Nixon’s decision to support Pakistan and to forcibly pressure India to renge in the 1971 conflict broke the seams of the relationship, marking a divergence from the precedent of American military support for India in 1962 (Garthoff 1994). The improving of relations with China and Pakistan for the US, and the opposite for India, led to geopolitical tensions that decayed Indo-American relations.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the intransigence of America’s Cold War Truman doctrine, its unavoidable conflicts with Nehruvian neutrality, and transitions in regional relationships demolished relations between India and the US from 1947-1971. It would be prudent for US policymakers to look to the history of these relations with respect to current tensions with NATO allies. They suggest that institutions of democracy are insufficient common ground for cohesion and diplomatic relations. Without just consideration of sovereign national prerogatives, a flexible vision for achieving American aims, and aligned geopolitical interests, fragments of antagonism can permeate even the most encouraging of relations.

The Indian example also posits a challenge to the validity of grand strategy in foreign policy. Scholars such as Gould have chastised leaders like Truman for his “meagre [intellectual]
preparation” (Gould 1988) for the task of the postwar presidency. The criticism carries an underlying point – grand strategy in foreign affairs may be insuperably limited by the imagination of its crafters. Whether this revelation is correctly leveraged in the future remains to be seen.
Works Cited


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-INt5rTdrqU


