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Abstract

After the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima, Japan, in March 2011, anti-nuclear movements and discourse in response to the risks of nuclear energy reached their height. Despite the 2011 nuclear meltdown and the following anti-nuclear movements, the Japanese government ruled by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) decided to resume operations of 9 nuclear power plants in 2015. Therefore, I am interested in the weaknesses and limitations of anti-nuclear discourses in Japan that cannot counter the government's energy policy. Through a critical analysis of discourses of Japanese leftist thinkers, such as SEALDs (a student activist organization against LDP-ruled government) and former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi who argue against the use of nuclear energy, this presentation claims that anti-nuclear discourses in Japan repeat the same rhetoric and logical structures that the pro-nuclear discourse uses. These rhetoric and logical structures include fideism and dependency on "life without a gift." After looking at the limitations of Japanese anti-nuclear discourses, the presentation applies contemporary thoughts of Japanese philosophers on fideism and post-truth (Masaya Chiba), and desire for a "life without gift" (Shinichi Nakazawa and Koichiro Kokubun) to reconstruct anti-nuclear discourse. Thus, this presentation does not stay in a Foucault-like discourse analysis that reveals the power relations between pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear narratives, but it uses the power relations to halt the reproduction of the same type of discourses and rethink of an alternative.
Keywords: Nuclear power, Anti-nuclear Movement, Discourse, Fukushima, Japanese Philosophy

Genichiro Takahashi and SEALDs, *Tell Me What Democracy Looks Like?* (高橋源一郎＋SEALDs、『民主主義ってなんだ？』)

This book is a dialogue between Genichiro Takahashi, a novelist and professor of the Department of International Studies at Meiji Gakuin University (as of 2015), and members of SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy-s). SEALDs was a student activist organization that protested against the 2015 military legislation, which passed the National Diet under the Abe administration, between May 2015 and August 2016. In this book, Aki Okuda, who was the leader of SEALDs, Yoshimasa Ushida, and Mana Shibata, talked with Takahashi.

This research only focuses on two chapters that are related to nuclear energy, which are named “Watching an anti-nuclear demonstration” and “The night before TAZ→SASPL.” The first chapter, “Watching an anti-nuclear demonstration,” places the origin of SEALDs at an anti-nuclear demonstration in the summer of 2012. SEALDs started as TAZ, which stands for Temporary Autonomous Zone, by students who were participating in an anti-nuclear demonstration that happened in front of Abe's official residence in June 2012, including Okuda and Ushida.

TAZ tried to transform the anti-nuclear demonstration to a place to discuss nuclear energy. In demonstrations organized by TAZ, discussions regarding nuclear energy were valued over protests under the collective voice of "anti-nuclear." Ushida says, "[I thought that] people should not say for or against [nuclear energy] easily, but they should study more about nuclear power plants and then come to demonstrate. I was saying that we should think more" (Takahashi
and SEALDs 31). Therefore, TAZ demanded a new form of demonstrations that departs from the extreme of the binary between pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear. But rather, it places emphasis on contemplation and discussion of nuclear energy. In fact, the form in which this book was written corresponds with the idea that TAZ pursued. This book takes the form of a dialogue—a combination of contemplation and discussion—between Takaishi and members of SEALDs while Takahashi interviews the members of SEALDs. In this kind of demonstration that TAZ pursues, participants come from different backgrounds.

Okuda: … There were people for and against nuclear energy. There were also students who were watching far away from the side of the official residence.

Takahashi: Didn’t that become some kind of an organization?

Okuda: It felt like it was just people gathering together. People came from various backgrounds. I saw a physics student from Kyoto University discussing with a junior high school graduate. (Takahashi and SEALDs 32)

Here, Okuda describes two kinds of diversity that are visible in demonstrations organized by TAZ. The first kind of diversity is the diversity of position/location. Not only the position regarding nuclear energy, but the degree of involvement in the demonstration was also diverse. The students who were watching the demonstration from far away indicates that there was no pressure that urged them to be involved in the demonstration and to speak up. The diversity of position/location is closely related to the absence of peer pressure in the demonstrations. In the second chapter, “The night before TAZ→SASPL,” Ushida complains about the peer pressure which existed in events organized by TAZ between September and October of 2012. According to Ushida, the second event, which was about DIY (Do It Yourself), every participant expressed similar opinions about the importance of DIY after organizers presented positive images about
DIY (34). Ushida’s comment clearly describes that TAZ created a space that forced a partial opinion to the participants, and no participants expressed objections to the opinion that was occupying the space. However, the demonstrations that TAZ organized in front of Abe’s official residence did not force conformity in terms of opinion regarding nuclear power and whether or not to express opinions.

The second kind of diversity that Okuda finds in TAZ’s demonstrations is the diversity of academic background. Okuda, for example, states the existence of a discussion between a physics student from Kyoto University and a junior high school graduate in the demonstration. Here, the physics student from Kyoto University symbolizes an elite who is knowledgeable in nuclear energy from a physical perspective. On the other hand, the junior high school graduate who could not go beyond compulsory education exemplifies a person with minimum academic experience. Despite the difference in academic backgrounds, they are able to discuss nuclear energy.

A Critical Analysis of the discourse of Takahashi and SEALDs

TAZ transforms anti-nuclear demonstrations to a new form of demonstrations, where participants think about and discuss nuclear energy. This transformation is achieved through two kinds of diversity: the diversity of position/location and the diversity of academic background. The diversity of position/location deconstructs peer pressure and conformity that are present in anti-nuclear demonstrations. And, the diversity of academic background allows an equal representation of people from different academic backgrounds in discussions.

The diversity of position/location and the diversity of (academic) background are the bases of democracy. In an ideal democratic society, peer pressure and conformity are avoided. Since democracy works under the freedom of speech and ideas, every person in a democratic
society should not be forced to belong to a certain political position or location. In addition, people should not be discriminated against by their (academic) backgrounds and thus should have equal representation in a democratic society. We think that it is more "democratic" when people from different backgrounds are represented in a decision-making process.

Therefore, TAZ pursues a democratic form of demonstration that guarantees the diversity of position/location and the diversity of (academic) backgrounds. The anti-nuclear demonstration led TAZ to rethink about the demonstration, which finally led them to reconsider democracy and how to "take back democracy." It is worth noting that the phrase "Take Back Democracy" is written in bold on the back of the book as its slogan. Hence, if TAZ were asked why they are against nuclear energy, they would answer that they are against nuclear energy because democracy is in crisis, and they need to take back democracy through anti-nuclear demonstrations. There are two implications when anti-nuclear demonstrations are used as a means to gain democracy.

First, TAZ cannot argue against nuclear energy if democracy decides for nuclear energy. TAZ argues that Abe’s pro-nuclear policy is problematic because it is not decided through a democratic process. However, this kind of reasoning would justify anything, including pro-nuclear policy, that is decided through a democratic process.

Moreover, although members of SEALDs depict the diversity of academic backgrounds in the demonstrations, the members of SEALDs themselves come from similar academic backgrounds. For example, the members of SEALDs who talk with Takahashi in this book—Okuda, Ushida, and Shibata—all study at Japanese universities at the time the book was published. Okuda and Ushida were students of Meiji Gakuin University, the university at which Takahashi taught. Shibata was a student at Occidental College at the time TAZ organized
demonstrations, but Shibata transferred to Sophia University in 2014 and became involved in SEALDs.) In fact, most of the members of SEALDs were university students, which can be presumed from the unabbreviated name of SEALDS—Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy-s.

The lack of diversity in academic backgrounds among the members of SEALDs, who lead the “anti-nuclear” demonstrations and events, corresponds to the situation that happened in Paris in May 1968. In May 1968, university students led by student figures such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit tried to involve Parisian workers into their rebellion. Students saw workers as central figures in achieving the overthrow of the de Gaulle government and the creation of a socialist society. However, the students could not directly encourage the workers to be involved in the movement because it would make them seen as the vanguards of the revolution. The students believed that they should avoid vanguardism based on Marxism-Leninism, an ideology that elites should lead the socialist revolution, at all costs. Rather, they believed that an authentic revolution spontaneously comes out from worker activism. Nevertheless, the students could not overcome elitist vanguardism in order to induce a revolution by workers.

The university students in Paris during the 1968 rebellion attempted to involve workers who were the major victims of the capitalist de Gaulle government. Similarly, the members of SEALDs believe that the diversity of (academic) backgrounds is important for equal representation in demonstrations since every person living in Japan is affected by nuclear energy in many ways. As a result, the members of SEALDs force people to think about nuclear energy. As Ushida says that people should study and think more about nuclear energy before they come to demonstrations, people who do not think about nuclear energy cannot argue for or against nuclear energy or express opinions regarding nuclear energy. However, the members of SEALDs
are able to think about nuclear energy and about democracy because of their academic backgrounds and financial status, which support them.

TAZ first liberated peer pressure by transforming anti-nuclear demonstrations, which is a place for representing a common anti-nuclear opinion, to space for democratic discussions, where different opinions regarding nuclear energy are presented. However, TAZ forced people to think about nuclear power, or else they cannot be involved in discussions, which is peer pressure of thinking about nuclear energy. Hence, TAZ recreates conformity within the anti-nuclear demonstrations in the reconsideration of democracy.

**Junichiro Koizumi, Zero-Nuclear, We Can Do It (小泉純一郎、『原発ゼロ、やればできる』)**

This book is written by Junichiro Koizumi, a former Japanese prime minister between 2001 and 2006, who was pro-nuclear as a prime minister but then became anti-nuclear. This book presents his basic anti-nuclear ideas by criticizing nuclear energy as an unsafe, expensive, and unclean energy source, and suggesting natural energy as an alternative energy source. This book is divided into four chapters: Prologue. We should not forget that "disaster," 1. "Safety," "Low cost," and "Cleanness" of the nuclear power plant were all lies, 2. We can do with natural energy even without nuclear, and 3. Let's change the crisis of "disaster" to a chance with "zero-nuclear."

Koizumi has two reasons to support his argument of "zero-nuclear," or to decommission all nuclear reactors in Japan and to never create a new reactor. The first reason for zero-nuclear is the dangers of nuclear power plants. There is, of course, the Fukushima nuclear meltdown that happened in March 2011 in the background of this reasoning. The second reason for zero-nuclear is that pro-nuclear policy goes against the trend of the world. Koizumi thinks that there is always a possibility that something happens that is beyond people's expectations. Before the nuclear meltdown happened in Fukushima, people were possessed with the idea that there would be no
natural disasters happening beyond what they have expected (Koizumi 34). In addition, Koizumi argues that risks that are always pertaining to nuclear power plants are much larger than their merits (Koizumi 37). One of the risks that Koizumi assesses, which makes the risks of nuclear power plants much larger than other technologies, is radioactive pollution of the earth. He states that:

Radioactive substances ruin the important land of the country and strongly impacts food and human health. Moreover, these harms continue until generations of our descendants. They [radioactive substances] will impose a severe burden on not only the people living now but also Japanese people who will be born in the future. (Koizumi 37)

Koizumi emphasizes that radioactive substances that nuclear reactors produce have severer and more pervasive, and more long-term effects. And these negative effects of radioactive substances that may leak from nuclear reactors would result in the “loss of national wealth.” Therefore, Koizumi argues that “Loss of national wealth (国富) is the loss of people (国民)’s lives that take roots in the rich land of the country (国土). Therefore, the operation of nuclear power plants that pollute the land of the country should not be accepted” (Koizumi 132). Here, he attaches the character Kuni (国), or country/nation in Japanese, to different nouns, such as wealth, people, and land. Koizumi discovers a “true patriotism” in pursuing zero-nuclear. A true patriotism, according to Koizumi, is to protect the land and the daily lives of the people who live in the country. Hence, energy production by nuclear power plants, which always expose risks on the land and people of the country, contradicts with patriotism.

Koizumi also argues that producing energy using nuclear power plants is obsolete and lags behind other countries which use renewable energy sources to produce energy. He compares the percentage of renewable energy sources that account for the entire energy production in
Japan: “The number 14.5% [the percentage of whole renewable energy source including hydroelectric power in Japan in 2016] is still the lowest level among the developed countries. In Germany, Spain, and other countries, renewable energy sources have exceeded 30% of the entire energy production” (Koizumi 83). Furthermore, Koizumi criticizes the pro-nuclear argument that the Japanese economy would not develop without nuclear power plants, by arguing back that the Japanese economy would be outstripped from the global economy if Japan depends on such technology (Koizumi 95). Instead, he suggests that the use of natural energy would make the Japanese economy sustainable. Koizumi states that "It has been said that Japan is a ‘country with no resources.’ However, there is an unlimited amount of resources if Japan changes its energy production to natural energy. ... The self-sufficiency of energy, which is the basis of people’s lives, brings about a considerate amount of national interests” (Koizumi 99).

Koizumi believes that natural energy is essential to sustain the Japanese economy without the assistance of other countries and keep Japan as one of the great economic powers of the world. Therefore, Koizumi places nuclear energy as a factor of stagnating Japan's economy and overall development under international competition. On the contrary, he emphasizes the significance of natural energy by arguing that Japan is capable of taking the initiative in global energy politics and thus lead the world in many aspects if Japan depends solely on natural energy instead of nuclear power.

The slogan, which is written on the back “To love a country is to do zero-nuclear,” clearly indicates Koizumi's patriotic sentiment, which is involved in his anti-nuclear argument. Two reasons that he uses in his book to support his anti-nuclear, or zero-nuclear, claim—risks of nuclear power and retrogression of nuclear energy in the world—both arrive at a point where people and land of Japan are the most important things that need to be protected. Koizumi's
patriotism is repeated throughout his book. For example, the title of the book, which is written on its front cover, is printed in gold. In addition, the title of the book and Koizumi's name are also written on the front cover and its backside in calligraphy that is written by Koizumi himself. The color gold symbolizes money and wealth, which corresponds with Koizumi’s patriotism that focuses on wealth (Kokufu, 国富) and national wealth (Kokueki, 国益). Calligraphy also demonstrates Koizumi’s preference in Japanese culture, which is imported from China. There is a clear intention of Koizumi to attach the image of patriotism with the title of the book “Zero-Nuclear, We Can Do It.”

Within the content of the book, Koizumi seeks the potential of the capacity of Japanese people in particular, which leads to his special attention to Japan and Japanese people. For example, in chapter 3 of the book, "Let's change the crisis of "disaster" to a chance with "zero-nuclear," Koizumi gives numerous examples of events and incidents where Japanese people altered crises into chances. Koizumi, for instance, portrays the history from the end of Edo period to the beginning of the Meiji period to prove that Japanese people created a democratic Meiji government from a Shogunate government, going through westernization by US gunboat diplomacy and two wars with China and Russia (Koizumi 114-16). Koizumi concludes that "When faced difficulties, it is important to think hard how to get over those difficulties. And, Japanese people have that ability [to get over difficulties that they face]" (Koizumi 119).

Perceptions of truth

Although Koizumi only needs to criticize the risks that nuclear power plants expose in order to present his anti-nuclear argument, he criticizes them in a way that people, including him, were deceived by the Japanese government, which did not present true information of the risks of
nuclear power plants. The strongest motivation of Koizumi that led him to write this book is to reveal the deception that the Abe administration used to justify its pro-nuclear policy. Koizumi writes that he was shocked when he first knew the truth of nuclear power plants, and he regrets that he believed the lies that the Ministry of Trade, Economy, and Industry, electric utilities, and researchers who have promoted nuclear energy told him (Koizumi 10). As a consequence, the first chapter of this book—"Safety," "Low cost," and "Cleanliness" of the nuclear power plant were all lies—debunks the "safety myths of nuclear power plants" that the Japanese government used to support its energy policy. Koizumi, therefore, criticizes the nuclear energy policy of the Abe administration because the administration misled people by spreading lies about nuclear energy to justify its policy. He argues that moving to zero-nuclear is inevitable because he revealed the truths about nuclear energy.

Koizumi's perception of truth in regard to controversies over nuclear energy is based on the idea that truth is a factor in deciding whether or not to support a particular policy. Hence, Koizumi uses the logic "A, B, and C are true; therefore, A, B, and C should be factors in deciding whether or not to support a policy X." Or perhaps, Koizumi thinks that information symmetry between the possessor/teller and the receiver of information is a necessary condition for policymaking. In Japan, the Abe administration, which possesses the true information about nuclear energy and has an obligation to tell it to the people, did not share the truth to the people, who are the receivers of the information that the administration shares. As a result, Koizumi points out that there is an information asymmetry between the administration and the people, which prevents a better policymaking.

On the other hand, SEALDs' perception of truth is based on a situation where people do not have any confidence in what is true and what is not. Ushida says that he could not distinguish
between true and false knowledge about nuclear energy:

What I thought when I was studying about nuclear power plants is that, experts [on nuclear power] that I have studied say opposite things. For example, a professor of the University of Tokyo says that nuclear radiation is less harmful than smoking, but an assistant professor at Kyoto University says that it [nuclear radiation] is hazardous. We don't know the truth (真理) anymore. Then, we need to gamble. ... Then, I want to bet on a future with no nuclear power plants. (Takahashi and SEALDs 33)

Ushida's comment indicates that he faces the situation of post-truth, and he makes an ex post facto justification to overcome post-truth. Ushida is lost with determining the truth about nuclear energy because of the contradiction between different experts about the same topic. Scholars describe the situation where contradicting pieces of information coexist as "post-truth."

Therefore, we can say that Ushida, here, encountered the situation "post-truth."

However, Ushida finally decides to support anti-nuclear arguments. His decision is not based on the information that he gained from experts on nuclear energy because he was unable to decide what is true under the situation of post-truth. Ushida could have believed in pro-nuclear expertise or an anti-nuclear one, but he decided not to think in both expertises. Instead of deciding truer information, he decided to "bet on a future with no nuclear power plants." The word "bet" and "gamble" connote an emotional decision without much rational contemplation and consideration. It seems that Ushida cannot rationally explain his decision to support the position of anti-nuclear. We know, through critical analysis of the discourse of SEALDs, that they support anti-nuclear arguments because they use anti-nuclear demonstrations to their program of "taking back democracy." Without considering the fact that anti-nuclear arguments are used as a means to achieve their ends, however, Ushida's decision is totally independent of
rational truth.

In his book “Nonsense without sense,” Masaya Chiba distinguishes between two types of nonsense: "nonsense with sense" and "nonsense without sense." "Nonsense with sense" is nonsense that creates a flood of infinite interpretations of an unknown truth. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, nonsense with sense corresponds to the Real or the impossible, that cannot be understood linguistically and through the image from the Symbolic and the Imaginary (Chiba 15). Therefore, nonsense with sense remains in every object even after they are given linguistic and imaginary meanings within the Symbolic and in the Imaginary. In Kantian philosophy, nonsense with sense would correspond to the thing-in-itself, the position of an object that cannot be observed and thought. However, Quentin Meillassoux argues that taking a position of the existence that is independent of rational thought can be a basis for an irrational fideism. Since the position of existence that cannot be thought (nonsense with sense) is located externally to the rationality of thought (the Symbolic and the Imaginary), any irrational propositions can be substituted to it (Chiba 18). In other words, one cannot refute rationally against fideism, which allows a belief that a certain irrational proposition is true and real.

Fideism happens when one relativizes every belief under the same position of "nonsense with sense." One can substitute any proposition to the unknown x, and no proposition can be the best fit for the unknown x. As a result, relativism allows a fanatic commitment to any substitutions to the unknown x. Under relativism, critics of relativism (absolutists) try to say what is universally "true" by using scientific evidence. However, their claim would not be fully supported by other people because their fanatic commitment to scientific evidence can also be seen as fideistic.

Returning to discourses of anti-nuclear arguments that are made by Koizumi, it is clear
that Koizumi falls into fideism because Koizumi assumes the existence of truth regarding nuclear energy. Although he believes that the truth of nuclear energy, which is that nuclear energy is unsafe, expensive, and unclean, has been revealed, Chiba’s argument on relativism suggests that Koizumi’s anti-nuclear argument is a mere interpretation of the unknown x of nuclear energy. On the other hand, the Abe administration has a different interpretation of the unknown x. Koizumi is conveying that my zero-nuclear position is true because the interpretation that the Abe administration made is not true. Consequently, Koizumi falls into fideism by believing fanatically in his own interpretation of the unknown x of nuclear energy. He tries to support his belief by referencing different scientific sources,—he presents his citations on the last 51 pages of his book, which consists of more than a quarter of his book—but as Chiba points out, his fideism would be a fanatic commitment to scientific evidence, which may lose its basis any time.

Chiba uses "nonsense without sense" in order to escape from relativism, which inevitably leads to fideism. Here, the unknown x, "nonsense with sense," or "truth" should be eliminated to reject relativism. Chiba substitutes the unknown x with "nonsense without sense," or "fact." "Nonsense with sense" or "truth" is a thing that is necessarily true, but "nonsense without sense" or "fact" is a thing that is contingently true. Thus, what are being stated around a single truth x are all relative statements or "interpretations" (Chiba 31). Chiba escapes from relativism—a situation where infinite interpretations are possible on a single truth x—by introducing the situation of post-truth. According to Chiba, post-truth is a situation where “truth, which is nonsense with sense, evaporates, the propagation of interpretations around truth ceases, and statements that contradict with each other express separate facts” (Chiba 32). In post-truth, there is no conflict between different interpretations of a single truth, but there is a conflict between fundamentally separate facts and between separate worlds.
Chiba's criticism of relativism, or fideism, is based on accepting the situation of post-truth—recognizing interpretations of truth as separate facts and thinking that it is contingent on existing in a certain world that shares common facts.

The problem here [when we think of accepting post-truth] is, how do we share the same facts. For example, even if we use scientific evidence [to share the same facts], we would be fallen into fideism if we argue that people sharing the same fact=world is a necessity. People coexisting in a certain world is nothing but contingent. A world as coexistence that is based on contingency can be said ritualistic—a ritual as a chain of body=form that is just as it is, without any basis of truth.

Under the situation of post-truth where worlds have been multiplied, it is necessary to lure (誘い込む) people into the ritual (儀礼) of the same fact=world. This is not an imposition of a particular norm. An invitation to a particular fact is necessary. This is sociality (社交). Sociality is a constant reconstruction of a ritual through negotiations between different facts=worlds, and an understanding of the ritual as a plastic thing that is always incomplete and capable of change. (Chiba 33-34)

Here, Chiba uses the word “ritual” (儀礼; girei in Japanese) to describe a way to encounter with other facts, or worlds, under post-truth. Ritual is not based on truth but contingency—the contingency where people exist in separate worlds, sharing separate facts by chance. As a result, Chiba does not eliminate the possibility of a sudden change in a particular fact into another fact at any time.

Applying Chiba's concept of "nonsense without sense" and his view on post-truth,
Ushida, one of the members of SEALDs, accepts the situation of post-truth and decides to live in a world in which people share anti-nuclear facts. When he says that he does not know the "truth" of nuclear radiation, he encounters nonsense with sense that is caused by the infinite propagation of interpretations of the risks and health concerns of nuclear radiation. When he bets to live in the fact, or the world, of anti-nuclear after encountering the nonsense with sense, he does not fanatically believe in anti-nuclear interpretation of the truth of nuclear radiation, but he takes over the fact of anti-nuclear by accepting the fact that he coexists in a world with other members of SEALDs who shares the same fact by chance. And the members of SEALDs does not share the same world by using scientific evidence but contingency—a contingency that students from different schools gather in front of Abe's official residence to think about and discuss nuclear energy.

According to Chiba, the world that is supported by anti-nuclear facts can suddenly and contingently become a world that is supported by pro-nuclear facts or any other world. SEALDs also thinks that the world in which they exist can change into another world but in the processes of contemplation and discussion. Hence, they think that a democratic procedure is needed for a sudden change in the world that they live in. What they assume in the plasticity of the fact=world is not contingent but may be caused by democracy. It is plausible, therefore, to think that the world in which the members of SEALDs live is reduced to the truth x of democracy. This means that SEALDs' anti-nuclear world was only an interpretation of the truth of democracy. Since anti-nuclear was a relative interpretation of absolute truth, their fanatic commitment to anti-nuclear demonstrations is a means for them to try to reach the unreachable truth x. Since democracy is placed in a position of "nonsense with sense," SEALDs would never understand democracy unequivocally; their ends would never be achieved.
In/dependency and “Life without a gift”

We should be aware that the theme of the second event that TAZ organized, which Ushida complained about its conformity, was DIY (Do It Yourself). DIY reflects SEALD’s fundamental principle of democracy that the people should do politics by themselves. There is a desire for independence and hatred of intervention.

In rhetorical terms, SEALDs uses English terms and their abbreviations frequently to represent themselves. SEALDs, of course, TAZ, and SASPL are all abbreviated terms that they have used to name themselves. For Japanese people, who are the audience of SEALDs, abbreviated names of English are difficult to understand because names are abbreviated, and they are in English when unabbreviated. For example, many Japanese people would not understand the meaning of the name SEALDs on two levels. The first level is that the word "SEALDs" refers to the English word "shield," which has the same pronunciation. The second level is that the unabbreviated form of SEALDs—Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy—is difficult to understand for many Japanese speakers. Of course, there is a Japanese translation of this form, but they decided to present themselves in this English form to Japanese people who are mostly non-English speakers.

In addition, Takahashi and SEALDs’ book has a title—“Tell Me What Democracy Looks Like” and the slogan—“Take Back Democracy”—which are translated in English, on the front and back covers of the book. SEALDs does not translate the title and the slogan of their book to express themselves and their ideas to non-Japanese English speakers because the book is written in Japanese. We should understand their use of English on the covers of the book as an appeal to the liberals of the English-speaking countries. For example, SEALDs' intentional use of the English word "democracy" shows their attraction towards Western liberal democracy. The
word "democracy" in Japanese is "Minshu-shugi," where "minshu" means that the people are the sovereign and "shugi" is the suffix "-ism" that indicates a certain ideology. So "democracy" in Japanese has a connotation of ideology. But SEALDs does not prefer anti-nuclear demonstrations, where the same anti-nuclear ideology is shared. On the other hand, they pursue a place for contemplation and discussion where a single ideology does not exist. Therefore, the English word "democracy" is appropriate for SEALDs to manifest themselves than using the Japanese word for "democracy." SEALDs' dependence on the use of English that does not exist in Japan is a manifestation of a Western-style "democracy" that does not exist in Japan.

I do not think that SEALDs' desire for a Western style of democracy is only reflected to the use of language. I believe that their desire for "democracy" is also a reflection of their desire for liberal democracy that pursued a big government. The time when the SEALDs movement in Japan reaches its peak corresponds to the time when Obama was the president of the United States. The Japanese government led by the Liberal Democratic Party—which is ironically a conservative party—and the US government led by Obama were a contrast with each other for SEALDs.

One of the factors that influence Koizumi to think the significance of transforming Japan's energy policy from nuclear energy to natural energy is the importance of self-sufficiency. Koizumi shares the same idea with the proponents of nuclear energy that it is important for a country to provide its energy using the resources that exist within the country. When he was the Japanese prime minister between 2001 and 2006, he was one of the proponents of nuclear energy and thus promoted the operation and construction of nuclear power plants. His pro-nuclear policy at that time was also influenced by his strong belief in the importance of independence in energy production (Koizumi 26). Even after he realizes the lies that the proponents of nuclear energy
have made in order to promote nuclear energy, he still argues the importance of self-sufficiency of energy production.

Self-sufficiency of energy production means the rejection of dependence on other countries. However, one of the reasons why Koizumi argues zero-nuclear is because nuclear energy goes against the trend of the global community. Therefore, Koizumi's zero-nuclear argument is fundamentally based on the dependence on the movement of other countries on energy policy. Hence, following Koizumi's argument, independence of energy production is based on the dependence on the "other." Koizumi, for example, superimposes the history of anti-war in Japan and anti-nuclear to indicate the need for dependence in achieving independence. He points out the similarity between the proponents of nuclear energy and the Japanese Army in the 1930s as they both craved for something that they thought was necessary for their lives and the existence of Japan. The Japanese Army occupied Manchuria in 1932. In 1941, before Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, the Allied Powers, including the United States, demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese Army from Manchuria. According to Koizumi, however, Manchuria was a lifeline for Japan after the Japanese Army occupied in 1932, which had been protected by Japan with many sacrifices. In particular, the Army did not want to withdraw from Manchuria because the officers had strong feelings towards Manchuria that they had built it with much effort (Koizumi 123). As a result, Japan entered into a war that was a lost cause from its beginning and lost. Koizumi finds out a similar structure in the feeling of proponents of nuclear energy. Proponents of nuclear energy believe that nuclear power plants are the lifeline for the Japanese economy and the lives of Japanese people. Therefore, they have a strong persistence in nuclear energy, like how the Japanese Army had a strong attachment to protecting Manchuria from other forces.
After the Second World War, Japan realized a substantial economic development between the 1950s and the 1970s with the support of the United States, namely the US-Japan Alliance. Koizumi describes the Japanese economic growth by saying that Japanese people adopted to a significant change of the times after the defeat in the war, and they transformed the crisis into an economic growth event they had lost Manchuria (Koizumi 125). Koizumi applies this logical structure of the post-war history to his zero-nuclear argument. Since Japan realized economic growth by following the United States and other Allied Powers, Japan can also seize a chance of development by decommissioning all nuclear reactors in Japan, which are implemented in many Western countries.

Koizumi lays emphasis on the similarity between the structures of pro-war and pro-nuclear sentiments, that proponents of war and nuclear energy both believe that Manchuria and nuclear reactors are necessary to sustain the existence of Japan. Koizumi wants to use this similarity between pro-war and pro-nuclear sentiments in order to argue that promoting nuclear energy is dangerous as promoting the occupation of Manchuria and the war. On the contrary, he also points out the structural similarity between US-Japan Alliance, which was a separate peace treaty that was signed after the war and Japan's opportunity for realizing zero-nuclear by following the Western trend. Hence, Koizumi's anti-nuclear posture, which aims for independent self-sufficiency of energy, implicitly assumes the support for anti-war and a separate peace pact with the US, which shows a total dependence of Japan on the US.

Shinichi Nakazawa’s *The Great Transformation of Japan* (『日本の大転換』) and Koichi Kokubun’s *Philosophy in the Atomic Age* (『原子力時代における哲学』) discuss the concept of a “life without a gift.” In *The Great Transformation of Japan*, Nakazawa introduces the concept of "mediation" in order to argue the exception of nuclear energy in the human history of energy.
production. Energy sources that humans have used before nuclear energy were introduced were all mediated by the sun. For instance, fossil fuel as an energy source is mediated by the sun because plants and animals, which are the basis of fossils, need sunlight in order to live and grow. Therefore, when an energy source is mediated by the sun, the energy source necessitates the sun's energy in order to function. This also applies to renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, as solar power is the energy of the sun, and the wind is caused by the difference in temperature in two different areas created by the heat of the sun. However, only nuclear energy generates energy without the mediation of the sun. Nuclear energy directly brought the process of nuclear fusion, which happens in the sun, on Earth (Nakazawa 21).

Therefore, Nakazawa analyzes that Fermi's experiment of a nuclear reactor in the University of Chicago in 1942 was not an innovation but an imitation—the imitation of the sun. By imitating the process of energy production of the sun, Fermi brought the phenomenon outside of the ecosphere into the ecosphere without the mediation of the sun. As a result, nuclear energy is the only energy source so far that does not depend on the sun's energy. Here, Nakazawa discovers the desire for a "life without a gift" (贈与なき生) in the proponents of nuclear energy.

"Life without a gift" is a life that rejects the gift of mediation from the sun. The heat and light from the sun, or the sun's energy, were historically perceived as a gift of nature that allowed humans to live on Earth, but the introduction of nuclear energy dismissed the idea of the gift of sun's energy.

The discourses of SEALDs and Koizumi regarding independence and self-sufficiency fit with Nakazawa’s “life without a gift.” SEALDs believes the importance of independence in democracy where people do politics by themselves. For SEALDs, the “gift” that they reject is people who do not think about nuclear energy. SEALDs finds their independence in leading
contemplation and discussions instead of anti-nuclear demonstrations. Thinking and discussing are the two elements that embody the DIY spirit. Therefore, SEALDs would reject people who do not think about or discuss nuclear energy because they are dependent on the conformity of the anti-nuclear demonstrations. For SEALDs, they only protest against nuclear energy without thinking about its merits and risks.

Koizumi's discourse on independence focuses on the ability of a country to generate its own energy without depending on other countries. Therefore, the "gift" that Koizumi rejects is the resources from other countries. Here, Koizumi believes that achieving the self-sufficiency of energy production within Japan is possible if Japan gets rid of nuclear energy and transforms into natural energy. His belief in self-sufficiency is similar to Nakazawa's concept of "life without a gift" because Koizumi rejects the mediation of foreign countries. He believes that Japan can be a complete, self-sufficient system, which is similar to what proponents of nuclear energy believe in nuclear reactors. But the problem with Koizumi’s logic is that he assumes the dependency on other countries in introducing natural energy. Hence, Koizumi denies the possibility of a “life without a gift” by his contradicting logic—a “life with a gift” is necessary in order to live a “life without a gift.” In other words, Koizumi proves by himself that it is impossible to live a “life without a gift.”

Kokubun’s *Philosophy in the Atomic Age* extends Nakazawa's argument that pro-nuclear sentiments are connected to a desire for a "life without a gift." Kokubun argues that the desire for a "life without a gift" originates from narcissism. Following Freud's theory of narcissism, Kokubun states that narcissism happens when libido, which is usually directed to external objects, is directed internally to the ego. The libido makes one feel in a condition of megalomania and omnipotence (Kokubun 276). Every person once had narcissism (primary
narcissism) but rejected it by accepting the reality principle (accepting that the realization of pleasure should be suspended many times in one’s life). What we are talking about right now is the return of the repressed narcissism (secondary narcissism). Kokubun emphasizes that Freud's analysis of the secondary narcissism is related to the indifference of the external world. According to Freud, infants are indifferent to the external world because they desire to be connected to their mother's breast, so the return of the repressed narcissism is a desire to return to one's childhood when one was connecting one's mouth to the breast of one's mother.

Kokubun’s hypothesis tries to make a connection between the proponents of nuclear energy and the infants that are not interested in the external world. Then, he points out that proponents of nuclear energy cannot possess Heidegger’s concept of Gelassenheit (releasement), which is an attitude of being open toward technology so that the technology will open its meaning and its “secret=mystery” toward us (Kokubun 280). Proponents of nuclear energy would not open themselves toward the technology of nuclear reactors since they are not interested in the world external to themselves. Then, they would never know the true meaning of nuclear energy, the true dangers that nuclear reactors expose, unless they overcome their narcissism.

Conclusion

Through thorough and critical analyses of two texts, which both advocate for anti-nuclear movements, we saw the ways in which their authors have relied their anti-nuclear narratives on narratives that pro-nuclear advocates use. In the light of Masaya Chiba’s concept of post-truth, Koizumi’s fideism on scientific evidence about nuclear energy demonstrates a similar belief structure of pro-nuclear supporters advocating for other pieces of scientific evidence, which support their own interpretation of nuclear power. Shin’ichi Nakazawa and Koichiro
Kokubun’s idea of “life without a gift” also indicates the dependency of the anti-nuclear discourses of Takahashi, SEALDs, and Koizumi on western ideas of “democracy” and “natural energy.” Furthermore, Takahashi, SEALDs, and Koizumi’s desires for national and academic independency, which contradict with these aforementioned dependencies, approximates to the narcissism—the indifference to the external world—that proponents of nuclear energy are falling into. From examining these limitations and contradictions of anti-nuclear discourses that we are able to construct a new anti-nuclear narrative that is capable of countering pro-nuclear narratives.
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