Israel's Modulation of Checkpoints: Systematic Manipulation of the Oslo Accords

Anna Rhodes
Knox College, aerhodes@knox.edu

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Cover Page Footnote
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Abstract

The theory of modulation, as introduced by Gilles Deleuze in 1990, serves as an instructive tool to think about the difficulties faced in Israel-Palestine. Israel modulates its policies concerning checkpoints and crossing between Palestinian-to Israeli-controlled territory based on its understanding of the Oslo Accords. Modulation provides opportunity for confusion, surprise, and total oppression. The deliberate actions of those with the most power to undermine their opponents ultimately trickles down into the individual lives of Israelis and Palestinians alike. Israel’s gradual policy manipulations at checkpoints since 1993 has led to an even deeper and more violent conflict than before the Oslo Accords were signed.

Keywords: Modulation, Palestinian movement, checkpoints

Introduction

It has been twenty-six years since the signing of the Oslo Accords. On September 13th 1993, the agreement was promoted on the grounds that it outlined a step-by-step plan for peace between Israel and Palestine--yet it has manifestly failed to do so. To build a successful two-state solution, it is essential that Palestine sustain an economy on its own and have the ability to fulfill the basic needs of its citizens. Israel currently employs a policy of modulation regarding the
standards established in the Oslo Accords to eliminate any possibility of Palestine establishing a viable state. As a result, the vision of Oslo has failed and left Palestinians in a situation worse than that with which they started with.

The purpose of the ambitious agreement was for the possible reconciliation of the persistent violence and mass murder that has been committed by Israelis and Palestinians alike. It addressed issues pertaining to the Israel-Palestine region that was assumed to be a solid framework for peace. Steps in this peace process include an interim transition period, transfers of authority, redeployment of Israeli forces, and other factors of a similar nature. Post-Oslo, the issues that have caused the most disagreement and unilateral action on the part of Israel are the issues of security and freedom of movement. Palestinians see these as direct violations of their rights to mobility. Israelis see these as a necessary means to keep their state secure and safe. The implications for safe passage and transportation of persons between the territory of Israel and Palestine is referenced multiple times throughout the accords. The closure policy, issued in 1991, was a response to the security fears of Israel that would then play out in the Accords of 1993. Oslo is designed to be a theoretical foundation on which Israel and Palestine could successfully obtain peace.

In reality, ambiguous details led to poor enforcement of the agreement. Two years after the Oslo Accords were signed, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (otherwise known as Oslo II) was signed. The necessity of Oslo II was based on the increasing issue of security disputes under Oslo I. Since the Second Intifada of 2000, checkpoints have been a systematic procedure that allows Israel to confine Palestinian villages and restrict mobility (Naaman). Palestinians are currently trapped in an incomplete framework that fails to protect their human rights and denies them an equal position on the world stage.
History of Occupation

In 1948-49, the nascent State of Israel and Arab armies fought over the land evacuated by the British Mandatory government of Palestine. Despite a UN plan that sought to establish both a Jewish and Arab state in the area west of the Jordan River, the land for the proposed Palestinian state was overrun by Israeli, Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian forces. The PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) was established on the grounds that the Palestinians needed an institution with which they could connect their national identity after their loss of territory in the 1948 war. It was made clear by the National Council at this time that the main purpose of the PLO was to serve as a spearhead for the liberation of Palestine (Hamid). In 1964, the PLO was chartered in Cairo, Egypt and had its main bases of operation in Jordan. Acting as its primary body, the National Council decided on certain needs in which the PLO will seek to meet for the Palestinian people: structured government, fiscal stability, and military presence.

The 1967 Six-Day War changed the face of the conflict. The Soviet Union warned Egypt that Israel was close to launching a major strike on Syria (Dowty). Once reoccupying Sharm el-Sheikh (which controls the maritime passage to the Gulf of Aqaba) Egypt announced the closure of the gulf to Israeli ships. Israel launched both an air and land attack on June 5, and after six days of fighting, they conquered the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt (Israeli forces withdrew from Sinai three years later), the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The Six Day War forever changed the geographical and political standing of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It sparked new radicalism within Palestinian culture.

The Camp David summit of 1978 advanced Western influence in the conflict. U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, mediated the following settlements: one agreement for Egypt-Israel peace, and the second a framework for West Bank-Gaza resolution. This enabled the
establishment of two legal statuses for people in occupied Territories; Israelis versus Palestinians -- necessary under international law, it staged the situation under Oslo. The Knesset Protocol of 1984 states that, for example, a Jordanian in the West Bank or an Egyptian in the Gaza Strip who remained in those areas is subject to Israeli law. Under this law, a Palestinian may be arrested by any soldier or policeman (16). The severity of the crimes committed are inconsequential. Within the jurisdiction of the Knesset Protocol, an Israeli citizen can only be arrested if they meet one of the eight requirements within the specific local laws that they are being accused of. A Palestinian may be held in custody for eight days before being brought before a judge to extend the period of detention. There is unequal treatment of Israeli and Palestinian citizens at checkpoints because there are different legal systems applied to the two populations.

In late 1987, the First Intifada began as a Palestinian uprising from the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza that shifted focus from the 1967 war. The 1967 war left Israel occupying approximately 40% of the land in the West Bank and Gaza (including 125 settlements and at least 60,000 Palestinians that had been displaced into other regions) (Gordon 28). Out of the Intifada rose radical Islamic groups, and in mid-1988, Hamas was formally organized. Hamas was direct and open about their opposition to the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization of 1964) and that they were a completely separate organization. Hamas was formed to serve as a terrorist group committing acts toward Israel in the name of the Palestinian people.

The 1991 Gulf War came at a time of heightened pressure in Israel’s security realm due to its timely conflict of the First Intifada. Israel was victim to missile strikes from Iraq, and although it left few civilians wounded, it made a significant impact on the country economically (Inbar). The war also had a profound impact on the diaspora of Palestinians living in the Gulf region who were expelled by the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Many Palestinians were forced to
return to the West Bank and thereafter struggled to find comparable employment and economic security (Arielli). The Soviet Union collapsed during the course of the Gulf War, which sent a large influx of Jewish immigrants to Israel and ultimately strengthened the country’s role on the international stage.

Israel instituted a closure policy in 1991 in response to the First Intifada and to govern Palestinian freedom of movement prior to Oslo. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Israel initiated the closure policy in order to closely regulate the flow of labour from Palestinian areas because the tensions from the First Intifada were at an all time high (Diamond). The general permit system was replaced with permits that lasted between 1 to 3 months, and the qualifying criteria to obtain the permit were subjective to the individual military personnel stationed at the checkpoint during on a given day (i.e., gender, age, and marital status) (Aranki 8). Roadblocks were put up with little or no warning at major transport terminals and checkpoints were shut down with increasing frequency. Israeli forces running the checkpoints were given jurisdiction under this policy to close terminals for different lengths of time. Under this policy, as long as checkpoints were closed, all valid permits were suspended (Arnon). The closure policy ultimately held an inequitable distribution of security power and enforcement.

The policy had major detrimental impacts on the lives of Palestinians living in occupied territories. Major life events of friends and family, education, or simply a job interview could suddenly be out of reach when a checkpoint was closed without warning or reason. By 1993, pressure on Palestinian and Israeli leaders necessitated a change of direction. The Oslo Accords were introduced as a framework for peace and for resolution of the outstanding security, political, and economic issues between the two parties. The closure policy dramatically restricted Palestinian
freedom of movement. This gave Israel control over the passage of Palestinians across borders that they regulated.

On the ground after Oslo, these issues were worked out most frequently at checkpoints on roads in and out of the West Bank and Gaza under the auspices of the Israeli Border Patrol (both Israeli police and military occupation) and led to conflict. Once the Palestinian autonomy expanded past the Jericho area, more specific arrangements needed to be made and were specified in Annex I of the 1995 Interim Agreement.

**The Oslo Accords**

While the peace process gave Israelis and Palestinians great hope about the future, the ambiguous nature of the security language in the Oslo Accords set up the parties for future trouble. The Oslo Accords cover a broad range of divisions in an attempt to discuss all things needed for peace in the region. Despite some measures being discussed in greater detail than others, the transportation of peoples going to-and-from Palestine only explicitly receives one sentence under Annex II of the Oslo Accords, “Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area” (as cited directly from the U.N GASC. Oslo Accords).

Annex II of the Oslo Accords is focused on the responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority and Israeli military forces to secure borders between Israel and Palestine once they are established. It was later stressed during the negotiations that Israel’s largest priority was to maintain a strong sense of security. In Annex I of the Oslo Accords, it states that both sides will “recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement” (UN GASC). Therefore, it is jointly agreed and explicitly stated in Oslo that Israelis and Palestinians alike are entitled to their human rights in a political and civil scope.
This division of legal status extends to freedom of movement, with vague arrangements for a safe passage stipulated in the Oslo Accords for Palestinians wishing to travel between the West Bank and Gaza. There were also specific arrangements for safe passage in the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Yet the Israelis have not followed through. The provisions described here specify what Israel must do in order to provide safe passage. Foremost, Israel is required to provide safe passage during the day (Watson). This requirement applies to all Palestinians that have an approved identification card and official documents proving that what they are transporting through the checkpoint has been approved and is safe for travel. There are stipulations for designated appropriate routes for safe passage. This includes the necessity of joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols of the roads in order to ensure “free, secure, and unimpeded movement of the roads” (as cited directly from the Cairo Agreement). In addition to this requirement, Palestinians also received the right of non-stop passage through a checkpoint (while assuming they have proper identification and permits for anything they may be transporting). The main concern within the course of designing a structure for effective mobility was to simultaneously maintain Israeli security and increase safe Palestinian passage.

**Israeli Intermittent Agreement of 1995**

The major change between the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995 falls within the canopy of safe passage. This agreement claims that it is Israel’s given right to deny safe passage to anyone who has ‘seriously or repeatedly’ violated the safe passage rules. This only includes those that have violated passageway law, not *any* Israeli law (as cited directly in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement). There were other implications decided on during the agreement, including the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territory and the return of Palestinian civil positions that were in the hands of the Israeli military during the
interim period. It was clarified that Israel had the right to ‘modify’ the safe-passage regime for security reasons including the right to interrupt a safe passageway temporarily, as long as one remained open.

To fully understand the magnitude at which Israel has modulated policy within the Interim Agreement, it is necessary to understand Areas A, B, and C as declared in the Interim Agreement of 1995. Negotiations took place on September 28, 1995 in Washington D.C. between Arafat and Rabin for the official signing of this agreement. The redeployment of Israeli military forces into what was Palestinian territory and a transfer of jurisdiction to the Palestinian Authority were main focal points in the improvements for this Interim Agreement (Tessler). These negotiations divided the territory into three categories—all harshly debated on in terms of inner policy and implementation on the ground. The main cities of the West Bank, Jericho, and Gaza were divided into Area A, which delegates civilian and security control to the Palestinians. Israelis are not permitted to enter Area A. In Area B, Palestinians are allowed to exercise administrative authority, yet with Israel still retaining overall security responsibility. This territory includes villages, small towns and refugee camps. Area B can be tricky for Palestinians to return to after crossing into Israel because they are subject to Israeli law at checkpoints due to Israel’s partial military security involvement in this area. Area C gave Israel sole control over civilian and security implications within that territory. Within Area C are Israeli settlements, military bases and state lands that prohibit Palestinians from entering or using that land.

The Interim Agreement was successful in its attempt in creating a higher traffic of Palestinian workers into Israel. In fact, according to a 2013 World Bank Report it significantly raised the employment rate in the West Bank and Gaza from 19 percent in late 1995 to 10 percent
by September 2000. Although successful in creating more Palestinian employment, Israel failed to uphold its commitment to withdrawing military forces from occupied territories.

Israel’s argument regarding their right to deny passage includes the power to deny passage to specific persons violating provisions. This does not apply to denying passage altogether or shutting down a checkpoint for anyone trying to come through. From 1994 to 2000, there were a total of 330 days in which all checkpoints were completely shut down (Cypel). That is almost a whole year overall in which the people of Palestine were unable to travel to work or receive medical care that is often only available in Israel. These instances carried on with deep intensity throughout the first several years of the Second Intifada, where tensions were at an especially high level.

**Second Intifada**

During the al-Aqsa intifada that began in September of 2000, checkpoints between Israel and Palestine faced an entirely new set of closure problems. There was a comprehensive system of checkpoints that emerged between 2000 and 2005 that “the total restricted area...appears to be in excess of 50% of the land of the West Bank” (World Bank 2007). Closures of checkpoint terminals and roadblocks appeared often and without warning of when they were opening up again in order to severely restrict Palestinian movement (Allen). The Intifada most often consisted of demonstrations throughout the West Bank and Gaza, primarily focused on checkpoints and the Israeli military forces stationed there. Israel’s checkpoint regime, which was originally justified as a temporary response to the Palestinian intifada, ultimately evolved into a permanent system of control (Monthly Humanitarian Monitor). The response was what Israel considered to be a necessary measure in protecting its citizens from suicide bombers and other forms of terror that the Palestinians were guilty of during the Second Intifada.
Throughout the Second Intifada there were many boycotts, incidents of civil disobedience and hunger strikes in retaliation to the Oslo “peace process” initiated by Palestinians (Gado). The Palestinian Authority (PA) attempted to bypass the Oslo negotiations and seek statehood through the UN. However, the UN refused their request until there was a halt in settlement construction, which does not look like it will slow down any time in the near future. Palestinian acts of violence killed more Israelis during the six-year period after the Oslo Accords (258) than before (160), thus the number of Palestinian lives taken by Israelis trumped the number of Israelis killed by Palestinians (Pearlman 133).

Hamas and Islamic Jihad were not members of the PLO and fiercely opposed the implications of the Oslo Accords. They created a conflict in which Palestinian opposition groups were the non state actors, the PA had the role of host government, and Israel acted as the coercer state. The Oslo Accords were designed to combat not solely terrorism, but also regular street crime. In reality, they further separated what were already two very isolated actors in ongoing political strife. Under the Accords, it was the Palestinians responsibility to “guarantee public order and internal security” (Oslo Accords). The PA has a mixed record on fighting terror groups, but it was believed to have been improved around 1999.

Along with the Second Intifada, rose the use of flying checkpoints. These were erected temporarily to provide extra closure to Palestinians. These created an extra level of checkpoint demonstrations in response to their ad-hoc arrival of a space that was previously free of direct Israeli occupation. People traveling through checkpoints at this time already had to go through the motions of heightened security at border terminals that were already established, and springing an ad-hoc checkpoint on them did not assist in calming these measures. The violence and terror that erupted throughout the Second Intifada prompted swift security action from Israel.
Israel had implemented a set of Open-Fire laws that significantly rose the level of violence in the Occupied Territories between IDF soldiers and Palestinian civilians. Soldiers were given jurisdiction to fire live ammunition under two circumstances. According to a report by B’Tselem made in 2002 on the specifications of the circumstances in which these laws could be permitted, there were two main criteria. The first, when human life was in jeopardy, neatly defined as “a real threat of the loss of life or grave bodily harm” (B’Tselem 2002). The second was explicitly during the apprehension of a suspect thought to be committing a serious crime. Theoretically, the open-fire regulations were supposed to be used as a last resort for a soldier. Needless to say, these requirements can be left up to discretion, and the high stress-levels of security conflicts were held at such high priority at these situations often escalated very quickly. Regulations changed numerous times throughout the Second Intifada, but none of the changes were authorized for public viewing.

**Security Wall**

Under the administration of Ariel Sharon in 2002, Israel’s construction of its security wall was underway. According to the former UN ambassador in the peace process for Palestinian relations, Dore Gold, the security wall serves a strictly military purpose (Falke). As a means for a wall to establish a stronger sense of border security for Israel, the checkpoint violations during the Second Intifada were occurring on a regular basis. Pressure from the Second Intifada pushed more aggressive border policies onto the government and military of Israel.

The social impacts of the security wall were massive. The border-society mindset pushed motivation for Israel to build a fence--both physical and symbolic. National identity is given a new concept when there is a large wall that separates one culture from another. Two histories that have been intertwined, through both conflict and culture, are diminished from each others’
sight. Israel’s stresses on border security were taken to a new level of political and social separation at the construction of this wall.

**Movement of Palestinians Through Checkpoints Today**

The mobility of those residing in Palestine is significantly restricted by the checkpoints controlled by Israeli forces. There have been countless reports of physical intimidation and humiliation of people passing through Israeli checkpoints. Situations can include the interrogation of children and the insistence of women to take off loose clothing to prove that they are not carrying anything up close to their body that is not allowed through the checkpoint (Peteet 101-5). Palestinians are often stopped at checkpoints and are not allowed through--despite proper identification and legal entry through the qualifications of that particular terminal.

To the Israelis, checkpoints are a form of security and total border control. For the Palestinians, they are a means of interruption and restrictions to the building of an economy. Although checkpoints are technically shared territory, they are essentially an Israeli controlled space. Large terminals such as Bethlehem or Qalandia are simple representations of how a checkpoint affects economy and social attitudes between the two sides. On the Bethlehem side on the road leading up to the checkpoint, roadways are congested with passengers trying to make their way into Israel. Once onto the Israeli side, the space opens up and the roadway is clear and no longer congested with cars backed up for miles.

Due to situations such as these, Palestinians face many challenges to simply work on the opposite side of a checkpoint. There are endless logistical implications of large terminal checkpoints, but the greatest detrimental effect is to the Palestinian economy. The irregular closings of the internal and external checkpoints have lead to at least 60 percent of the Palestinian population living in poverty (Hammami 27). Depending on varying identification required for a
Palestinian to pass into Israeli territory, passengers are often interrogated on their personal belongings in the vehicle and their reason for going through the checkpoint. Israeli justification for these alterations are consistently linked back to the priority of security for the state at all costs. This directly infringes on the agreement of Annex II in the Oslo Accords because it does not allow for safe passage of persons between the Israel and West Bank territories (both economically and from a humanitarian standpoint). Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in October 2000, there has been an extraordinary theft of human rights. Students are unable to reach school, pregnant women are held at checkpoints. Water tank trucks are prohibited at a checkpoint to get to their destination of a rural village. Travel costs have skyrocketed.

Most Palestinians have to travel through multiple checkpoints to cross into Israel. For example, Palestinians in Hebron that wish to travel into Israel must pass through a series of internal and external checkpoints. There are eight internal checkpoints around Hebron, and multiple external checkpoints (mostly on Route 60) on the course to get to the final Israeli checkpoint before crossing the green line (B’Tselem 2019). There are strangling closures at which the checkpoint closes down for a specific reason, or a breathing closure, in which no logic is given (Naaman). It is also common that vehicles are not allowed between internal and external checkpoints (that are miles apart from each other). Therefore, families with luggage or livestock, pregnant women, children, and the elderly must either find other means to assist them in making this divide or go on foot. It is also common that if Palestinians are let through an internal checkpoint of Palestine, the external checkpoint will be closed ahead and they are stuck in between checkpoints until the other reopens.

An example of the potential effects of a checkpoint shut-down can be observed in Ramallah. On December 13th, 2018, there was a shutdown of the city of Ramallah in the West Bank.
Bank. From the 13th to the 19th there were 28 temporary checkpoints constructed by Israeli military forces, in addition to the eleven permanent checkpoints, to better restrict the flow of movement in and out of Ramallah (PCHR). The shutdown was initiated by an attack carried out by a Palestinian near an illegal Israeli settlement in Ofra, resulting the killing of two Israeli soldiers, according to a news report from mannews.com. The Palestinian attack directly followed the killing of three Palestinians in separate raids throughout the West Bank, prompted by Israeli forces. These violent events prompted the Israeli army to declare Ramallah a closed military zone and proceeded to carry out extensive searches on and around roads entering and exiting the city. The total lockdown lasted for at least twenty-four hours, but exact details of how many checkpoints were reopened and at what time were not recorded.

The violent incidents that initiated this shutdown are not uncommon. Tensions between Israeli military forces and Palestinian civilians is evident in daily occurrences of one side committing acts of violence upon the other. Israel’s place on the world stage is dominated by their military strength and when Palestinians pose any threat to this reputation, no matter how small, they are symbolically threatening Israel’s reputation as a whole. Israel is fearful of appearing complacent to any degree with Palestine discourse and to compensate they habitually take drastic measures to maintain total dominance. The city of Ramallah resides in Area A of the West Bank, and therefore Israel does not have legal jurisdiction within the city. However, they maintain the right to close checkpoints and administer the mobility of those within the territory.

Nonetheless, these violations under the Oslo Accords by the Israeli government and military prohibit the mobility of Palestinians that is undeniably necessary for them to build a successful state separate from Israel. According to a 2012 study done by the Truman Institute for Advancement of Peace, approximately 70 percent of Israelis support a two-state solution, but are
steadfastly wary of Palestinian intentions (Halevi 168). Today, the Middle East is no closer to peace than it was in 1993. Had Israel followed the exact framework described in the Oslo Accords, they would not have been able to gain its heavy presence in Area A, B, and C. The theory of modulation has allowed Israel to make military moves and manipulate policies that once narrowly fit within the groundwork of the Oslo Accords. The areas are not broken up into large groups. It keeps Area A (Palestinian controlled) and Area B (partially Palestinian controlled) far apart from each other. In between the different territories are checkpoints that Palestinians must pass through under the individual circumstances of the terminals. This is a major social and economic divide within Palestine’s culture, economy, and overall identity. The push of competing military action and security balance deeply affects the culture and civilian life of the people that are at the mercy of their government’s actions (Wilkenfeld).

**Theoretical Framework**

Some scholars say that this is an ad-hoc, on-the-ground response to a shifting situation. I argue that the modulation of vague arrangements set forth in the Oslo Accords and the Interim Agreement of 1995. The direct quotations from these documents that I have cited above have been left up to broad interpretation of moral values that can fluctuate with each individual. Perceptions of what is just and unjust fluctuate between the individual and the collective national identity of the society that the individual belongs to. It is my understanding that Israel’s manipulation of the policies were justified in the sole purpose of maintaining security for its people under any circumstances. The modulated policies were done in response to individual Palestinian aggressors. However, like the broad policy interpretations done on the ground, the effects of the policies are equally as broad and can infringe on the lives of those residing in the West Bank or Gaza that have no control over the terrorist acts of other Palestinians.
Modulation is a concept used to describe these occurrences, which signifies an environment wherein there is a constant changing of rules (Weinberger). The laws that Israel places on Palestinians at checkpoints are ever-changing (i.e. “modulation of control.”) The policies defined in the Oslo Accords are purposely ambiguous in order for Israel to have a wider jurisdiction when there is uncertainty in what is disputed.

Philosopher Gilles Deleuze argues that the diminishment of sovereign forms in the Israel-Palestine conflict is gained by seeking more efficient ways of ordering and social control. If people are unable to track exactly what right is being violated, then they have little or no grounds to go about advocating for due process. This is most obvious in the civil rights abuses at checkpoints. Although some of these issues are explicitly addressed in the Oslo Accords, Israel has used their authoritarian military and government to their advantage. Modulation is the basis on which Israel has been able to sustain their control over major compartments of the Palestinian economy. The Oslo Accords are written to work towards a Peace Process between the two actors.

Social ordering implies that rules are elusive and ever-changing, much like Israel’s policies regarding the West Bank. The 500,000 Israeli settlers currently living in Palestinian Occupied Territory are an example of how Israel has consistently pushed back on standards set in place in the Interim Agreement pertaining to regulations of Area A, B, and C. An extra-dialectical condition is what has been allowed to perpetuate within the humanitarian effects of Israel’s aggressive policies. This condition includes relative acceptance of a movement that is happening without the control of those affected, and it thus empowers the actors of the movement. This phenomena has lead to the increase of the Palestinian Authority to be manipulated by international actors and the Israeli government. Israel has repeatedly given priority to security matters over legal solutions, and this originates in the Oslo Accords. When the Oslo Accords were written and thought of to be
a roadmap of peace, it forced the whole world to recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel. With United States support and influence during the Clinton administration, all heads were turned to the middle east.

**Concluding Thoughts**

The Oslo Accords were planned to have governmental presence for an overall framework of peace in the middle east. Overall, they were implemented poorly on the ground and did not create a further roadmap to peace. The Interim Agreement of 1995 specified security implications and outputs of the new policy, but ultimately divided the two sides further. If the layout for security had been carried out by Israel and Palestine equally, there would be less of a socioeconomic and civil difference between the two sides. Although there are many approaches to understanding the perpetuation of conflict in the region, the modulation of policies by the Israeli government is a potential means to better understand it. It is impossible to create sovereignty between two groups occupying the same area if there is not a mutual understanding of what boundaries are set.

Checkpoints equate mobility, healthcare, transportation of goods, and a fluid society. They are vital aspects of life that the Palestinian people need to build a successful state. There must be individual freedom for the citizens, as well as the more broad understanding of the ways western influence shapes the world’s opinion. The deliberate actions of those with the most power to undermine their opponents ultimately trickles down into the individual lives of the Palestinians. If the Oslo Accords and the Interim Agreement had more success in its implementation, Israel and Palestine could potentially have much better odds of reconciliation. Nonetheless, to oppress millions of other people under the name of what was originally intended to be a framework for peace diminishes any positive consequences of the document. Israel’s gradual policy manipulation
since 1993 has led to an even deeper and more violent conflict than before the Oslo Accords were signed.
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